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Abstract: This article conducts a genealogy of Freud’s never fully-developed concept 
of the narcissism of minor differences, which first appears in his writings in 1917, and 
then three more times with slight variations.  It starts with an earlier articulation of the 
concept in 1908 in a letter from Ernest Jones in Canada to Freud.  The article outlines 
the background to Jones’ presence in Canada and his assessment of Canadians, and 
goes on to argue that in its subtle differences from Freud, Jones’ version of the 
concept provides a clarification of what is essential in Freud’s version.  Among the 
questions it helps us answer is whether minor differences beget narcissism or 
narcissism cathects minor differences.  In other words, tracing the path by which the 
idea develops tells us something interesting about its eventual shape.  The article 
concludes that Freud does not so much borrow from Jones, as provide an analysis of 
Jones’ letter through his modifications of it.  The article finishes by arguing that the 
concept provides a different route into the philosophical and psychoanalytic question 
of the love of the neighbor, an issue central to the ethics of Jacques Lacan, and 
subsequently to Žižek and Santner. 
 





A minimal chronicle of the early history of Anglophone psychoanalysis would 
include at least the following: Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung’s English and American 
patients in Vienna and Zurich; Abraham Brill’s first translations of Freud into English 
in New York; and Freud, Jung and Sándor Ferenczi’s voyage to the New World in 
1909, bringing with them ‘the plague’, as Freud told Jung on the boat before he 
delivered the Clark Lectures in Worcester, Massachusetts.1 To this list could also be 
added a lesser known foray by the Welsh analyst, Ernest Jones, who spent four years 
between 1908 and 1913 in Toronto, Canada, in what he considered exile from Europe 
and from the centres of psychoanalysis. Jones built alliances, disseminated 
psychoanalytic ideas, and advanced the cause in North America in those four years, 
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but his direct impact on his host country is more difficult to gauge. What is certain is 
that he mostly disliked Canada and was happy to leave it.  
The assessment that Jones made of the country and its inhabitants in his first 
months there in a letter to Freud was far from flattering, but of considerable interest 
for the history of psychoanalysis: ‘Well, Canada is larger than Europe […] and has 
the population of London’ Jones informed Freud in December 1908, going on, 
Toronto is a prettily built town, though the architecture is extremely mixed. 
Music is rare here, and there is not a picture gallery in the country. The people 
are 19 parts American, and one part Colonial, therefore are very insulted if 
called Americans. I have always noticed that the more difficult it is to 
distinguish people (e.g. Norwegians and Swedes, Flemish and Dutch, Spanish 
and Portuguese), the more insulted they feel at being confused with each other. 
They are a despicable race, exceedingly bourgeois, quite uncultured, very rude, 
very stupid and very narrow and pious. They are naïve, childish and hold the 
simplest views of life. They care for nothing except money-making and sport, 
they chew gum instead of smoking or drinking, and their public meetings are 
monuments of sentimental platitudes. They are horror-struck with me because I 
don’t know the date of the King’s birthday, for they take their loyalty like 
everything else in dead seriousness and have no sense of humour.2 
The first part of Jones’ complaint about Canadians – his dismissal of their sensitivity 
about being mistaken for Americans – bears a striking resemblance to Freud’s 
concept of ‘the narcissism of minor differences’. Compare Jones’ words, for instance, 
with these ones published by Freud more than twenty years later in Civilization and 
its Discontents: 
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It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, 
so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their 
aggressiveness. I once discussed the phenomenon that is precisely communities 
with adjoining territories, and related to each other in other ways as well 
(gerade benachbarte und einander auch sonst nahestehende Gemeinschaften), 
who are engaged in constant feuds and in ridiculing each other - like the 
Spaniards and Portuguese, for instance, the North Germans and South Germans, 
the English and Scotch, and so on. I gave this phenomenon the name of ‘the 
narcissism of minor differences’ (der Narzißmus der kleinen Differenzen), a 
name which does not do much to explain it. We can now see that it is a 
convenient and relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination to aggression, 
by means of which cohesion between the members of the community is made 
easier. In this respect the Jewish people, scattered everywhere, have rendered 
most useful services to the civilizations of the countries that have been their 
hosts.3 
The narcissism of minor differences is scattered through Freud’s writings, but is 
never the subject of a separate essay or inquiry. The concept has nevertheless found 
considerable purchase beyond psychoanalysis. It attracted particular attention in the 
1990s in the wake of civil wars and atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
for its apparent explanatory power. Michael Ignatieff, for instance, draws on it to try 
to understand the formation of mutually hostile ‘ethnic’ groupings in the wake of 
failed states, where no such groupings existed previously.4 In another register, it is 
seen retrospectively as a framework for a theory of social stratification developed in 
the work of sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu, who argues that ‘Social identity lies 
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in difference, and difference is asserted against what is closest, which represents the 
greatest threat.’5 
The concept has also attracted criticism. Brett St Louis notes its usefulness, but 
worries about Freud’s apparent naturalization of the conflicts that arise from minor 
differences: ‘Freud’s inability to concretely understand why groups should be so 
acutely receptive to such “details of differentiation” becomes problematic in the 
temptation to explain it as an “elementary character” which is magnified by 
summation of its benign form that disregards its pernicious effects’.6 Others claim 
that Freud underestimated the ways in which small differences might become the 
justification for extreme violence.7 However, given the limited material on which to 
make judgments, and the subtle changes Freud’s terminology undergoes over twenty 
years, any criticism can only be provisional. As St Louis puts it, ‘by [Freud’s] own 
standards, the “narcissism of minor differences” is extremely underdeveloped and 
must be considered more a notion than a concept’.8 And as Freud said himself in 
Civilization and its Discontents, the ‘name […] does not do much to explain’ the 
phenomenon. In this light, Jones’s letter of 1908 takes on greater significance, adding 
a fifth primary text on the narcissism of minor differences, and allowing not only for a 
longer genealogy of Freud’s idea, but in its subtle difference from Freud, a 
clarification of what is essential in Freud’s version.  Not the least of the questions it 
helps us answer is whether minor differences beget narcissism or narcissism cathects 
minor differences.  In other words, tracing the path by which the idea develops will 
tell us something interesting about its eventual shape.  It will also provide a different 
route into the philosophical and psychoanalytic question of the neighbor, for which 
another part of Civilization and its Discontents is the usual starting point. 
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Jones in Canada 
Ernest Jones went unwillingly to Canada, leaving behind scandal in England, forced 
into resigning his post at a London hospital after the parents of a ten-year old girl 
complained when he sought out a sexual etiology for an hysterical paralysis in her 
arm. These were the first fruits of Jones’s initial encounter with Freud, in April 1908 
at the inaugural International Psychoanalytical Congress in Salzburg. Jones soon 
became a trusted member of Freud’s inner circle, the only Gentile in the seven-strong 
secret ‘Committee’ dedicated to defending psychoanalysis from its detractors and 
apostates. He was also a founder and future President of the International 
Psychoanalytic Association, first President of the British Psychoanalytic Society 
(1919) and first editor of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis (1920). Known 
for his political zeal and organizational acumen, he identified intensely with 
psychoanalysis as an institution, and was more dogmatic about its precepts than Freud 
ever was.9 So devoted was he to the Cause that he became known as ‘Freud’s 
Rottweiler’. But before that Jones endured four years of exile across the Atlantic, 
where Freud, in their long correspondence, encouraged him to stay, in order to 
stabilise and extend the psychoanalytic beachhead in America.10 
Like many who are desperate to return from whence they came, Jones’s work 
rate in Toronto was prolific.  Shortly after his arrival in September 1908 to take up a 
post at the University of Toronto, the UCL-trained neurologist established a private 
clinic specializing in ‘nervous diseases’ at 407 Brunswick Avenue. In addition to his 
private analytic practice, he was soon promoted to Associate Professor at the 
University, and moonlighted as assistant psychiatrist at the General Hospital.11 When 
the publication of Freud’s Clark Lectures brought prestige to psychoanalysis, Jones 
attracted more analysands, both Canadians and Americans who crossed the border to 
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see him, including among them the daughter of William Meredith, the University’s 
Chancellor, an analysis that by all accounts had a successful outcome. The hazards of 
a new science that gave such importance to sex were as real in Toronto as they were 
in London, and he required police protection after a former patient threatened to shoot 
him, accusing him of having sexual relations with her. In the end the patient was paid 
off with a sum of $500, amounting to a year’s salary for Jones. Throughout the affair 
he had the full support of Robert Alexander Falconer, Bible scholar and President of 
the University of Toronto. 
All this gave Jones ample case material to write up, and it was the most 
productive period of his life: he published a total of 70 articles in the technical 
journals in his years in Canada.  Among these were his essay ‘On the Nightmare’ and 
the first version of a landmark piece of Shakespeare criticism, his paper on Hamlet, 
published in January 1910 in the American Journal of Psychology as ‘The Oedipus 
Complex as an Explanation of Hamlet’s Mystery.’ He served as assistant editor of the 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology from 1908 and reviewed and abstracted for six 
further journals in Europe. In Toronto he also acted as co-editor of the Bulletin of the 
Ontario Hospitals for the Insane, alienating his fellow editors and contributors by 
taking up three quarters of the space with his own work. He was asked to leave the 
journal after publishing an article about a patient who mimicked oral sex whilst 
comparing it to the sacrament.12 In 1913 the University turned down his request to 
split his year between London and Toronto, so he resigned his post and returned full 





Canada, America, Psychoanalysis 
In his autobiography, Free Associations, Jones credits his productivity to the weather, 
which was either too cold or too hot, with September the ‘one tolerable month’ in 
Toronto.13 Nevertheless, he says that 
Life in Toronto was in many ways very pleasant. Curiously enough, one partook 
of cultural activities more than in London. There, where so many were 
available, one had to make an effort to find the necessary time. In Toronto there 
was only one serious centre, the Massey Hall, and everything that came there 
did so only for a week. So it became always a weekly habit to attend, and it was 
very rewarding, since the most celebrated artists of the musical and theatrical 
world always included Toronto in their American tours. Any gap would be 
filled by the Montreal Opera Company, which was very good indeed. Then 
there were regular visits from the magnificent American orchestras, with their 
famous conductors, all on a level which London has never reached.14 
Records indicate that Harry Lauder, Ellen Terry and Isadora Duncan, among others, 
appeared at Massey Hall while Jones was in Toronto.15 On the day of Jones’ letter to 
Freud on the Canadians, Gilbert and Sullivan’s Iolanthe was beginning a three-night 
run. Also appearing regularly at Massey Hall during Jones’ Canadian sojourn were 
the Sons of Scotland, the Loyal Orange Lodge, and the Ancient Order of Hibernians, 
each one catering for a different ethnic particularity.  There is no evidence of an 
expatriate Welsh organization booking the Hall.   
Jones’ praise for Toronto cultural life may be an example of what he calls his 
‘newly-won tactfulness’ in a country where ‘sensitiveness to criticism’ was ‘a 
national characteristic’.16 Biographers give a less complimentary account of his views 
of Canada. T.G. Davies notes that, 
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While living in Canada, [Jones] was frequently reminded of the pressures of the 
Victorian influences to which he was subjected as a child, and his overtolerant 
attitude in sexual matters did not endear him to the people of a city that boasted 
the name Toronto the Good. He […] longed so much for life in Europe that he 
joined the city’s German Club.17 
The rigidity of Upper Canada morality might have provided rich clinical material, but 
no city with an elevated notion of its own goodness could be expected to tolerate, 
never mind openly embrace, psychoanalytic thinking; while psychoanalysis itself 
dismisses efforts to be good as fruitless homage to a severe and unresponsive 
superego. Jones said of the conformity of Torontonians that ‘one knew beforehand 
everyone’s opinion on every subject, so there was a complete absence of mental 
stimulation or exchange of thought.’18 
Jones’s views on the sexual mores of North Americans matched the consensus 
amongst European psychoanalysts. For example, before Jung’s own distaste for the 
centrality of sex in psychoanalysis caused him to split from the Viennese analysts, the 
Swiss regularly cited the ‘prudery’ of Americans as an obstacle to psychoanalysis 
across the Atlantic.19 ‘The so-called freedom of research in the land of the free,’ Jung 
wrote to Freud in 1910, ‘has indeed been well guarded – the very word “sexual” is 
taboo.’20 While Jones was in Toronto, Sándor Ferenczi wrote to him a sweeping 
assessment of North American sexuality, that might make us wince now, and not just 
for its old world condescension: 
The cultural climate prevailing in the United States has the effect of 1) 
repressing heterosexuality (hence: admiration for women), 2) favouring (usually 
well-sublimated) homosexuality (sports, intimate friendships, politics, work 
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teams.) To guard against the encroachment of homosexuality, women are then 
worshipped and admired in an even more exaggerated fashion.21 
Perhaps Ferenczi hits on something in relation to the idealisations and sublimations of 
American public life, but there is also something here of the early analysts convincing 
themselves of their own courage in overcoming bourgeois prudishness about sex. 
Psychoanalysis ultimately took root the most successfully in America, but in this view 
it is a backward territory, steadfastly not wanting to know about the sexual factors that 
drive human action. 
Freud was known to have quipped that America, was ‘gigantic’…. ‘a gigantic 
mistake’.22 This didn’t mean that he took no interest in it, even if the psychological 
establishment in the United States was hostile to Freudian thought, for he was 
convinced that the future of psychoanalysis was in America. That is, for Freud, the 
future of European psychoanalysis lay in American financing. In 1909 he wrote to 
Ferenczi with admirable knowledge of Yankee slang that ‘America should bring 
money, not cost money.  By the way, we could soon be “up shit creek” the minute 
they come upon the sexual underpinnings of our psychology.’23 Later, in the throes of 
austerity in Austria after WWI, Freud complained to Jones about the lack of 
American support for the psychoanalytic journals he had founded: ‘What is the use of 
Americans,’ he asked, ‘if they bring no money?’24 
As Jones’ Canadian acquaintances were keen to remind him, Canada is not the 
United States, and the two nations cannot be dissolved into each other, but Freud 
himself did not differentiate particularly between the two, and considered Jones’ 
presence in Toronto simply part of psychoanalysis’ inroads to ‘America’. After the 
Clark lectures in 1909, the travelling party of Freud, Jung and Ferenczi made it as far 
as Niagara Falls, but when Jones invited Freud to Toronto, Freud took up James 
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Jackson Putnam’s invitation to his cabin in the Adirondacks instead. At Niagara, 
Jones recounts in his biography of Freud, ‘They took a trip in the Maid of the Mists 
below the Falls and also set foot in Canada, to Freud’s great pleasure.’25 We know 
nothing more of what the father of psychoanalysis made of Canada and Canadians. 
 
Jones to Freud: development of an idea 
When Freud first proposes the narcissism of minor differences in his essay of 1917 on 
‘The Taboo of Virginity’, he invokes the idea to explain hostility between the sexes 
rather than between nations or neighbouring communities: 
it is precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form 
the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility (Fremdheit und Feindseligkeit) 
between them. It would be tempting to pursue this idea and to derive from this 
‘narcissism of minor differences’ (Narzißmus der kleinen Unterschiede) the 
hostility which in every human relation we see fighting successfully against 
feelings of fellowship and overpowering the commandment that all men should 
love each other.26 
He picked up the idea again in 1921 in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the 
Ego.  Now it is used to refer to differences between communities and nations, even if 
the exact term ‘narcissism of minor differences’ is not used: 
Every time two families become connected by a marriage, each of them thinks 
itself superior to or of better birth than the other. Of two neighbouring towns 
each is the other’s most jealous rival; every little canton looks down upon the 
others with contempt. Closely related races (Nächstverwandte Völkerstämme) 
keep one another at arm’s length; the South German cannot endure the North 
German, the Englishman casts every kind of aspersion on the Scot; the Spaniard 
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despises the Portuguese [….] In the undisguised antipathies and aversions 
(Abneigungen und Abstoßungen) which people feel towards strangers with 
whom they have to do (nahestehende Fremde) we may recognise the expression 
of self-love – of narcissism [….] We do not know why such sensitiveness 
should have been directed to just these details of differentiation (Einzelheiten 
der Differenzierung).27 
Freud then revisited the idea in his final book, Moses and Monotheism (1939), but this 
time without mentioning narcissism. In the context of an exploration of the religious 
origins of the hatred of Jews, he notes ‘Other grounds for hating the Jews’: 
They are not fundamentally different (grundverschieden), for they are not 
Asiatics of a foreign race, as their enemies maintain, but composed for the most 
part of remnants of the Mediterranean peoples and heirs of the Mediterranean 
civilization. But they are nonetheless different (sie sind doch anders), often in 
an indefinable way different (undefinierbarer Art anders), especially from the 
Nordic peoples, and the intolerance (Intoleranz) of groups is often, strangely 
enough, exhibited more strongly against small differences (kleine Unterschiede) 
than against fundamental ones (fundamentale Differenzen).28 
In total there are four occurrences of the concept in Freud’s writing, but only in two of 
these does Freud use the phrase that gained such currency subsequently. Even then, 
there are small differences: ‘kleine Unterschiede’ in 1917 has by 1929 changed to 
‘kleine Differenzen’, going by way of ‘Einzelheiten Differerenzierung’ in 1921. In 
1939 Freud then reverts to ‘Unterschiede’ for small differences, reserving 
‘Differenzen’ for the larger ones. 
Ernest Jones’s letter on the Canadians precedes ‘The Taboo of Virginity’ by 
almost a decade, but is it the original source for the Freudian kleine Unterschiede? Or 
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was he simply rendering in psychoanalytic terms a common observation about less-
than-loving neighbours?  We know from Jones himself that Freud was not averse to 
exploiting narcissisms of minor difference. He reports that when they met in 
Salzburg, nine months before the letter from Toronto, Freud’s ‘first remark’ was 
‘From the shape of your skull you can’t be an Englishman; you must be a 
Welshman.’ Whether he divined this from my cranium, which I very much 
doubt, or from my name and perhaps facial expression, what struck me about 
the remark was that it was the only occasion I ever found anyone in Austria or 
Germany who knew of the existence of my native country.29 
Freud in fact had this information in advance from Jung, who had met Jones in 
Amsterdam in 1907 and had noted then the Welshman’s Celtic origins.30 If it matters 
who came first, then, we might say that Jones’ letter on the Canadians was the 
continuation of a dialogue opened by Freud’s flattery on their first meeting. What is 
clear is that Freud at no point credits Jones.  His circuitous development of the 
concept might even lead us to suspect that he is covering any tracks that might lead 
back to his disciple. That is, Freud only arrives at the Jonesian formulation by way of 
detours, and when he completes the concept he has effectively reversed the 
perspective given by Jones on the Canadians. Or rather, the constituent elements are 
the same – hostility, narcissism, and minor differences – but Freud reconfigures their 
structural relations. 
In the first iteration, the essay on the taboo of virginity, Freud makes no 
mention of nationality or ethnicity. Instead, he introduces the narcissism of minor 
differences through the relation between husband and wife in marriage. In other 
places Freud makes much of the psychical consequences of the difference between 
the sexes, but here suggests that the difference is only small, and for this reason is a 
 14 
potential source of hostility. The context is his attempt to account for ‘the generalized 
dread of women’ experienced by men in primitive, but also modern, cultures, and the 
taboos that arise around women as a result.31 When he then articulates the narcissism 
of minor differences, in the passage already cited, he credits the idea in the first 
instance to the English anthropologist Ernest Crawley, and his notion of a ‘taboo of 
personal isolation’. In a notable choice of phrase, he claims that Crawley ‘uses 
language which differs only slightly from (nur wenig von…unterscheiden) the current 
terminology of psychoanalysis’ when he ‘declares that…it is precisely the minor 
differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of 
strangeness and hostility between them.’32 There is thus a sort of rhetorical contagion 
at work: Freud is able to transmit the concept of minor differences between people 
thanks to a minor difference (nur wenig von…unterscheiden) between the disciplines 
of anthropology and psychoanalysis.  
But one will look in vain in the source text that Freud refers to – The Mystic 
Rose: A Study in Primitive Marriage (1902) – to find the statement that Freud 
attributes to Crawley, in psychoanalytic or any other terms. What Crawley does 
provide is a model of tension and conflict between the two sides in marriage. 
According to Crawley, marriage ceremonies ritually acknowledge and dissolve this 
hostility: 
marriage ceremonies have inherent in them, as binding the pair together, or 
neutralizing each other’s dangerous influence, the intention and power to make 
their life harmonious and sympathetic33 
In Jones’s account of Canadians and Americans, this element of hostility is what is 
missing: the narcissistic Canadian is wounded by the mistake, but this is not because 
the American, in Jones’s brief account, poses a threat. That Freud chooses to 
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acknowledge the English anthropologist, who has not really spelt out the idea of 
minor differences in terms of narcissism, at the expense of the Welsh analyst who has, 
might be a symptomatic displacement, a displacement that also illustrates neatly an 
ethnic difference (between Welsh and English) considered small to all but the parties 
concerned. 
In the second iteration of the concept, in Group Psychology, Freud introduces 
for the first time the question of national or ethnic identity already proposed by Jones. 
However, narcissism does not appear here until later in his argument and in a slightly 
different context, when he explains that ‘antipathies and aversions which people feel 
towards strangers with whom they have to do’ are an ‘expression of self-love’. The 
phrase in English awkwardly translated as ‘strangers with whom they have to do’, is 
in German the much more economical ‘nahestehende Fremde’. ‘Nahestehende’ can be 
translated simply as ‘related’, but it also contains as its root ‘nahe’, meaning ‘near’. In 
other words, in this iteration, it is as much a question of the proximity of the stranger 
as it is his or her difference, minor or otherwise, that provokes narcissism. The thread 
linking this version with the first iteration is matrimony: Freud starts with families 
connected by marriage, moves to ‘neighbouring towns’, and finishes with ‘closely 
related races’. The German phrase translated as ‘closely related races’ – 
Nächstverwandte Völkerstämme – also implies in the first instance proximity or 
nearness, as do the ‘neighbouring towns’ (benachbarten Städten). We now also find a 
direct, if partial, trace of Jones: where the Welshman compares his insulted Canadian 
with rivalrous Spaniard and Portuguese, Dutch and Flemish, and Norwegian and 
Swede, Freud retains only the first pair, trading the others for the South German 
intolerant of his Northern cousin and the Englishman slandering a Scot. 
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By the third iteration, in Civilization and its Discontents, Jones’ disputatious 
Spaniard and Portuguese have become a regular feature. Freud also complicates the 
picture by adding an additional figure of aggression, but this time not as part of a pair: 
it is ‘the Jewish people, scattered everywhere’, who ‘have rendered most useful 
services to the civilizations of the countries that have been their hosts.’ Only now 
does Freud bring together the question of the narcissism of minor differences, and the 
question of proximity broached in Group Psychology. In Strachey’s translation we 
find: ‘communities with adjoining territories, and related to each other in other ways 
as well’. In Freud’s German, we have the same terms relating to proximity that he 
used in 1921: ‘gerade benachbarte und einander auch sonst nahestehende 
Gemeinschaften’. It is, therefore, the situation of Jews in Europe that allows him to 
complete the idea, providing an example that combines proximity and (minor) 
difference. He goes on to drily observe that ‘unfortunately all the massacres of the 
Jews in the Middle Ages did not suffice to make that period more peaceful and secure 
for their Christian fellows (christlichen Genossen)’.34  When he then returns to the 
idea in 1939 for its fourth iteration in Moses and Monotheism, the treatment of the 
Jews in Europe is again his example, although this time it is Nazism rather than 
narcissism that he invokes. The differences between peoples may remain small and 
‘indefinable’ (undefinierbarer Art anders), but in the fresh historical circumstances, 
Freud abandons the language of nearness. The Jews are not nahestehende, but instead 
an außenstehende Minderzahl, an ‘extraneous minority’ in Strachey’s translation. A 
more politically loaded translation might be ‘alien within’; an anachronistically 
Lacanian one could even give us ‘extimacy’. (In his briefest of direct interventions on 
the subject, Lacan proposes idiosyncratically to translate the narcissism of minor 
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differences as ‘conformist terror’, thereby calling attention to the coercive group 
identity secured through small differences.)35 
 
Freud’s analysis of Jones 
Far-fetched as it might seem to seek in Jones’ brief letter on the Canadians the basis 
of Freud’s narcissism of minor differences, most of the elements of Freud’s idea are 
already there, if not quite in the same order. We could go even further and say that 
Freud does not so much borrow from Jones, as provide an analysis of Jones’ letter 
through his modifications of it. What does Freud add to Jones then, and what does he 
change? 
The most straightforward addition made by Freud to Jones is his introduction 
of hostility (Feindseligkeit) or aggression (Aggression) to the theory. In Jones, 
Canadians ‘are very insulted if called Americans’, and Spanish and Portuguese are 
‘insulted at being confused with each other.’  But there is no mention in Jones of 
hostility towards the American on the part of the Canadian, or towards the Portuguese 
on the part of the Spaniard. Narcissism, on the other hand, is strongly implied in the 
bruised vanity of the Canadian, who harbours an intense, if misplaced, sense of his 
own uniqueness. But this narcissism does not manifest itself in the presence of the 
American with whom the Canadian is easily confused, but instead to a third party, 
who is not directly concerned (that is, to Jones). In Freud, by contrast, the observing 
third party witnesses neighbours ‘who are engaged in constant feuds and in ridiculing 
each other’.36 In other words, their narcissism is not a concern with their image in the 
eyes of the third party, but instead a direct result of the encounter with the neighbour. 
It is, however, not out of the question that Freud drew on Jones in this case, 
because hostility is already present in Jones’ analysis. This hostility is Jones’ own for 
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Canadians, whom he proceeds to insult in every possible way in the rest of the letter 
to Freud. The list is long: they are ‘despicable’, ‘bourgeois’, ‘uncultured’, ‘rude’, 
‘stupid’, ‘narrow and pious’, ‘naïve, childish’, ‘sentimental’ and humourless. 
Although Jones does not exactly describe the hostility of the narcissism of minor 
differences in his judgment of Canadians, he manifests it himself in his vitriol towards 
‘colonials’, a very large proportion of whom originate from the same islands as he 
does. It is as if Jones constructs the theory of the narcissism of minor differences, but 
fails to put it all together, keeping the elements separate and leaving it to Freud to 
condense them in a single structure. Freud therefore carries out a sort of dream 
analysis on Jones’ letter, but in reverse. Where the condensations of the dream-work 
are usually undone in analysis so that component parts are revealed, here it is the 
condensed structure that is revealed from the component parts. This is in fact a 
method that Jones pioneered. He called the unconscious process ‘decomposition’ and 
added it to displacement and condensation as key techniques of the dream-work.37 
Where the dream-work (or other unconscious mechanisms) decomposes dream 
thoughts into separate elements, and thereby disguises their relation to each other, the 
analysis recomposes, demonstrating the underlying whole.  
The motive of the hostile attack on Canadians becomes apparent when the 
final piece of decomposition is undone. Jones’ narcissism of minor differences 
separates him from his hosts in order to bring him closer to Freud and to a 
psychoanalytic community that values humour and culture as much as it disdains 
bourgeois morality, piety and sentiment. His contempt for Canadians’ royalism and 
his ignorance of the King’s birthday are equaled only by his devotion to the new 
monarch to whom the letter is addressed. Identification with a conventional ideal 
(Edward VII) is replaced by a new, more exclusive one (Freud).  
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Freud therefore reworks Jones’ hostility so that it is intrinsic, rather than 
extrinsic to narcissism. But if the origins of Jones’ hostility to the Canadians are 
clearly contingent, this is not always the case in Freud’s theory as it developed 
latterly. Just as Freud fails to settle on a single term to name his concept, so with 
hostility he prevaricates. Although Freud uses the same word – Feindseligkeit 
(hostility or animosity) – each time to describe the affective byproduct of the 
narcissism of minor differences, on each occasion after its first use in ‘The Taboo of 
Virginity’ he modifies it slightly. In Group Psychology, this hostility comes 
accompanied with ‘antipathies and aversions’ (Abneigungen und Abstoßungen); in 
Civilization and its Discontents, it is a manifestation of the Aggressiontriebe 
(aggressivity, or aggressive drive); and finally, in Moses and Monotheism it is part 
and parcel of the Intoleranz towards Jews.  These slight differences are far from 
incidental, because each implies a different interpretation of the origins of hostility. If 
Feindseligkeit is the product of an innate tendency towards aggression, then Freud 
appears here to drift towards the primordialism that Brett St Louis warns against; 
whereas to speak of it as a form of intolerance introduces a social, ethical or political 
dimension to the narcissism of minor differences.   
Separated by only nine years, Civilization and its Discontents and Moses and 
Monotheism each have their historically determining contingencies. In choosing the 
more emphatic ‘aggression’ in 1930, Freud pointedly writes against Wilhelm Reich 
and other politicised psychoanalysts who were attempting to merge psychoanalysis 
and Marxism. For these analysts, repression was the enemy of human potential, and 
‘individual liberation from crippling neurosis’ could be combined with ‘economic 
liberation from poverty.’38 If Freud is unequivocal in his insistence that repression of 
a primary aggression is necessary to the security of civilization, it is at least partly 
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because he wants to reject the opposing Reichian formula.39 Freud’s flexibility in 
relation to these matters is evident in Moses and Monotheism, written in the shadow 
of state-sponsored anti-Semitism. In this new context Freud presents such hatreds not 
as inevitable, but as evolving and historical, even if the structures of that history are 
ancient, as the subtle change from ‘aggression’ to ‘intolerance’ indicates. It is also 
worth remarking that with the example of anti-Semitism given by Freud in both texts, 
the narcissism of minor differences is no longer reciprocal, as it is in the case of the 
Spaniard and the Portuguese, whose hostility, according to Freud, is mutual. On 
neither occasion when he invokes the concept in relation to the Jewish people does 
Freud make mention of their hostility in return.  
With the example of anti-Semitism, Freud therefore introduces the possibility 
that the narcissism of minor differences might be experienced asymmetrically, with 
relative social or political power a determining factor. It is not a possibility that he 
entertains in relation to Englishman and Scot, nor does Jones take into account the 
balance of power between Canada and the United States in his analysis of Canadian 
narcissism. Jones does, however, propose an answer, if only humourously, to a 
question that is necessary and which threatens to throw the whole theory into doubt. 
That is, what exactly constitutes a minor difference?  What allows us to distinguish 
between minor difference and major, and at what stage does one become the other? Is 
the point of the narcissism of minor differences that the minor difference is 
misconstrued as major? Or does the narcissism of minor differences construe 
difference where there is in fact none at all?  In Freud, where the terminology shifts 
on each occasion, there is prevarication on this issue. In Jones, minor difference is 
calculated precisely at five per cent: the Canadian is nineteen parts American and one 
part ‘colonial’. 
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By rendering it in such absurd terms, Jones leads us to conclude that the 
difference is in fact insignificant and it is only narcissism that gives weight to the one 
part in twenty. The difference may be insignificant, but once we take into account 
asymmetrical power relations, as Freud does in his later iterations of the idea, it no 
longer matters whether the difference is real, but that it is taken to be so. As Karl 
Figlio notes in his account of the concept, ‘the antipathy of the narcissism of minor 
differences does not arise as a consequence of difference, but in the creation of 
difference.’40 He goes on to suggest that this engendering of difference is no less 
consequential for being hallucinatory: 
The differences that spark violence are delusions, fostered by projection: that is 
implicit in the idea that the group is an ego ideal, whose demands are most 
immediately satisfied by violence against the non-ideal, demeaned, other.41 
In this context it is worth remembering that in his major theoretical intervention on 
narcissism, Freud links self-love with the delusions of the paranoiac, whose libido is 
withdrawn from external objects.42 Narcissism may struggle to survive an encounter 
with difference, but the narcissist is in no position to evaluate the quality or 
magnitude of any difference from the other encountered. If Freud prevaricates on the 
difference between minor and major and offers no equivalent to Jones’ five per cent 
hypothesis, it is because the question is irresolvable. 
 
Porcupines 
The theory does not simply dissolve in the fluctuations of these differences that are 
always relative to the needs of narcissism, neither firmly minor nor major. This is 
because Freud adds one further element to what Jones so briefly sketched, tilting the 
emphasis of the theory from the question of difference to the pressures of proximity. 
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On each occasion when Freud writes of the narcissism of minor differences, it is 
always in tandem with a closeness that provokes the phenomenon. Whether it is 
‘Trennung’ (separation) and ‘fernhalten’ (to keep away) in ‘The Taboo of Virginity’, 
or ‘nahestehende’ (near-standing) in Group Psychology and Civilization and its 
Discontents, or außenstehende (outside-standing) in Moses and Monotheism, Freud’s 
vocabulary always modulates the kleine Unterschiede with a language of distance and 
distancing. This spacing of minor differences indicates that it is not so much the other 
as the neighbour that is at stake in the theory. 
Freud signals as much when he prefaces the discussion in Group Psychology 
with a reference to Schopenhauer’s parable of the porcupines: 
A company of porcupines crowded themselves very close together one cold 
winter’s day so as to profit by one another’s warmth and so save themselves 
from being frozen to death.  But soon they felt one another’s quills, which 
induced them to separate again. And now, when the need for warmth brought 
them nearer together again, the second evil arose once more. So that they were 
driven backwards and forwards from one trouble to the other, until they had 
discovered a mean distance at which they could most tolerably exist.43 
The necessity for warmth and the discomfort of proximity therefore take priority over 
any moral or ethical law set up to govern social relations. Freud’s suspicion of the 
injunction in Leviticus to ‘love your neighbour as thyself’, implied here, is spelt out in 
more detail in Civilization and its Discontents, where he observes that the injunction, 
obediently repeated in religious times, was no preventative to the regular slaughter of 
ones’ neighbours.  It is openly against this Freudian grain that contemporary theorists 
Kenneth Reinhard and Eric Santner take up Freud with the aim of finding a way, 
however paradoxical, to love the neighbor in a Freudian way.  This love is not for 
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minor differences but rather for what Reinhard calls ‘the kernel of jouissance that is 
both foreign, strange, and unrecognizable in the other and intimate to me’ and for 
what Santner describes as ‘that which is most objectlike, most thinglike about the 
other’.44  In this way, the neighbour is neither reduced to a set of aggravating traits, 
nor a cosy friendly figure, but is acknowledged in his or her enigmatic core. 
Santner and Reinhard have for a prickly travelling companion Slavoj Žižek, 
who reworks to other ends the parable of the porcupine in his own account of the 
neighbor. Asked to give his love to this figure, Žižek retorts ‘No thanks!’: 
It is easy to love the idealized figure of a poor, helpless neighbour, the starving 
African or Indian, for example; in other words, it is easy to love one’s 
neighbour as long as he stays far enough from us, as long as there is a proper 
distance separating us. The problem arises at the moment when he comes too 
near us, when we start to feel his suffocating proximity – at this moment when 
the neighbour exposes himself to us too much, love can suddenly turn into 
hatred.45 
In his various repetitions of the idea, Žižek nods to Freud, but his direct source is 
Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis. In that seminar, Lacan says of Civilization and its 
Discontents that Freud ‘talks of nothing but’ the commandment to love one’s 
neighbour: it ‘is where he begins, where he remains throughout, and where he ends 
up’.46 The lesson there is not quite what Žižek makes it out to be, though, nor indeed 
what Reinhard and Santner claim in a more saintly key. Rather than the quills of our 
fellow porcupines making them unloveable if we get too close to them, love is 
precisely what allows us to get close, but avoid the encounter. As Kathleen O’Dwyer 
remarks in relation to Žižek, ‘the avoidance of an encounter with the singular and 
concrete experience of the neighbour is propelled by an aversion to one’s own 
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vulnerability and lack, which might be mirrored in the other’.47 It is an observation 
that brings us very close to the narcissism of minor differences after all.  
Love’s power to avoid the encounter is shared with the other two Lacanian 
‘passions’, hatred and ignorance, which like love, are modes of misrecognition. Love, 
after all, Lacan repeats everywhere, always takes as its prototype and ideal narcissism. 
Love, then, is a means to keep the neighbor at the right distance, but self-love is also a 
means for the subject to avoid an encounter with itself.  In Seminar 20: Encore, Lacan 
coins the term ‘hainamoration’ (hateloving) to capture the proximity of these two 
passions.48 And Julia Kristeva tells us that the ambivalent desire for and hatred of the 
‘Jew’ (in Céline, but also more widely) is possible because he ‘is under our skin, the 
very closest neighbor, the nearly same, the one we do not differentiate.’49 What, one 
wonders, would Ernest Jones have encountered, what enigmatic core might he have 
found in those Canadians, reputedly so nice, so courteous, had he unburdened himself 
of his hatred-love for them?  And would Freud, given the chance, have entered into as 
many contortions as Reinhard and Santner to accommodate the enigmatic neighbour, 
or would he have preferred Kierkegaard’s view that the only neighbor one can truly 
love is a dead one?50  It is reported that before his trip to America Freud said ‘I am 
going to the USA to catch sight of a wild porcupine and to give some lectures’.51  
Perhaps he chose Putnam’s Adirondack cabin over Jones’ invitation to Toronto 
because he was more likely to encounter a porcupine in the Adirondacks.  At the end 
of a long hike near the end of his visit, Freud finally came across a porcupine corpse. 
 
For their advice on this article, I am grateful to Dani Caselli, Ken Hirschkop, Rob Lapsley, Nuria 
Triana-Toribio, and Ben Ware. 
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